01 Strategy & Outlook

Washington Just Set the Price of Terbium. Think About What That Means.

Thirty-two kilometers northwest of Minaçu, a town of about 30,000 people in the Brazilian state of Goiás, there is a clay deposit called Pela Ema. It is not a beautiful place. It is a red-brown scar in the cerrado where a company called Serra Verde washes rare earth elements out of ionic clay with ammonium sulfate: no blasting, no radioactive tailings ponds, just leaching. Most investors have never heard of it. As of this week, the United States government has put its balance sheet behind it to the tune of $1.55 billion.

Here is the part you need to understand — and it has almost nothing to do with Brazil.

The deal, announced this week, comes in three pieces: $750 million of direct Pentagon investment, upsized from an earlier $500 million; a $500 million senior secured credit facility from a tier-one institutional bank; and $300 million of forward purchase commitments from the Defense Logistics Agency over five years. Phase one targets roughly 4,000 metric tons of rare earth oxide equivalent per year, rising toward an average of 6,400 tons across a 25-year mine life. First deliveries are expected in the fourth quarter of this year.

That is the plumbing. Now the pipe that matters.

For the first time, the U.S. government has set price floors on heavy rare earth elements — hard numbers, written into a contract, escalating 2% a year. Terbium at $2,050 per kilogram. Dysprosium at $575 per kilogram. Neodymium-praseodymium at $110 per kilogram.

Put those next to what the same metals cost inside China. In mid-August, Chinese domestic terbium oxide was trading around ¥6,600 to ¥6,660 per kilogram, call it $990 to $999. Dysprosium oxide ran ¥1,365 to ¥1,405, or roughly $205 to $211. So Washington has guaranteed about twice the Chinese price for terbium and nearly three times the Chinese price for dysprosium. And for NdPr — the light rare earth that goes into every ordinary magnet — the floor of $110 sits almost exactly at the Chinese market price of $107 to $110.

Keep in mind what that asymmetry tells you. Washington is not subsidizing rare earths. It is subsidizing the four or five heavy elements that China can switch off and the West cannot replace: the ones inside a fighter jet's actuators, a nuclear submarine's drive motors, a precision munition's guidance fins. On the light stuff, where alternatives exist, the government is paying market. On the heavy stuff, where they don't, it is paying whatever it takes.

Mike Cadenazzi, Assistant Secretary of War for Industrial Base Policy, put the logic plainly: "Securing resilient domestic and allied supply chains is a fundamental warfighting requirement." George Kollitides, who runs the Economic Defense Unit, was blunter about the arithmetic. The investment protects "the production of everything from fighter jets and nuclear submarines."

This is not an isolated cheque. On August 13 the Pentagon signed more than $2 billion in critical-minerals deals in a single day: conditional loans totaling $1.95 billion to Sila Technologies, Niron Magnetics and Sunrise Energy Metals, $85.5 million of direct equity in Strategic Bauxite USA, and $81.3 million for mining and metallurgy workforce programs. The Commerce Department finalized up to $1.6 billion for USA Rare Earth's mine-to-magnet build in Stillwater, Oklahoma. Add the development-finance facilities and you are looking at something north of $5 billion committed in about six weeks.

And there is a clock on it. On November 27, China's suspension of enhanced U.S.-focused export licensing for gallium, germanium, antimony and graphite expires. Two weeks before that, on November 10, the Kuala Lumpur trade truce runs out. Jack Lifton, co-chair of the Critical Minerals Institute, framed the stakes better than any government official has: "November 10 is not simply an export control deadline. It is the day the West discovers whether it has built anything that China cannot interrupt."

So why does this matter to you?

Because a government price floor is a transfer of risk from the producer to the taxpayer, and that transfer is what makes a mine financeable. For fifteen years, Western rare earth projects died in the same place: the bankers ran the numbers, saw that Beijing could crush the price whenever a competitor got close, and walked. A contractual floor kills that argument. It doesn't make these companies good businesses. It makes them bankable businesses, which is a different and, for a while, more profitable thing.

If you own the equities, understand exactly what you own — not a commodity bet, but a policy bet. The floor is your downside. Washington's attention span is your risk.

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02 Global Intelligence

Defense & Fiscal

The Number Nobody Wanted to Be Chair For

On August 18, the total federal debt of the United States crossed $40 trillion. It stands near $40.05 trillion today. It has doubled in roughly a decade. Think about that.

Kevin Warsh has been Fed chair since the winter. On Friday morning at 10:00 Eastern, he steps to the podium at Jackson Lake Lodge for his first Jackson Hole keynote, nineteen days before the September 16 FOMC decision. The official theme is financial innovation and payments. Nobody in that room cares about payments.

Here is what he is walking into. July PCE inflation printed at 3.7% year over year. At the July 28–29 meeting the committee held the target range at 3.50% to 3.75% for the fifth straight time — but the vote was 9 to 3, and all three dissents went the hawkish way: Beth Hammack of Cleveland, Neel Kashkari of Minneapolis, and Lorie Logan of Dallas all wanted 25 basis points more. The minutes released on August 19 showed officials seeing a need to hike if inflation refuses to cool. Warsh's own line from July was not the language of a man looking for an excuse to cut: "There is no soft implicit target, not on this committee's watch."

Now put the debt next to the policy. Through the first ten months of fiscal 2026, the Treasury paid $931 billion in interest, up 11% on the same period last year. Net interest now runs near 14% of all federal outlays and exceeds annual defense spending. The average interest rate across all outstanding Treasury securities hit 3.41% in June, the highest since 2009, and it is still climbing as cheap 2020-vintage paper rolls off. The deficit for those same ten months was $1.8 trillion, $169 billion worse than last year, with no recession anywhere in the data.

The bond market has noticed. As of the August 25 H.15, the two-year yields 4.17%, the ten-year 4.64%, the thirty-year 5.17%. That long bond touched 5.19% last week, its highest since 2007. Foreign buyers are still showing up: the August 25 two-year auction cleared 4.204% with indirect bidders taking 66% of the paper against a 57% average. They are showing up at 4.2%. That is the price of admission now.

In other words: a Fed that may need to hike, a Treasury that needs to borrow $6 billion a day, and a long bond already at levels last seen before the financial crisis. Every paid-up subscriber has heard me make this point before, and Buffett has been making it for forty years — the arithmetic of compounding works in both directions. This is the other direction.

If you are holding duration because you expect rate cuts, I urge you to reread the July dissent count.

Energy

Two Ships

On August 24, exactly two commodity vessels transited the Strait of Hormuz. The ten-day average is fourteen.

That single number tells you more about the oil market than any inventory report. Day 180 of the Iran conflict finds the Strait technically open and functionally closed. The U.S. naval blockade of Iranian ports remains active: 70 vessels redirected as of August 23. Coalition strikes on Iranian territory are in their twenty-seventh night of pause, but nobody has signed anything.

On August 25, Iran and Oman announced a temporary transit corridor seven miles wide, routed through Iranian territorial waters. Markets read it as a thaw. Tehran corrected them immediately. Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said Iran "would not consider the strait open" without U.S. movement on sanctions relief and unfrozen assets. The next day, a Houthi ballistic missile struck the Saudi tanker Amzan off Yanbu, and a separate unidentified projectile disabled a tanker off Oman.

The price action is stranger than the politics. Brent sits near $88.57 and WTI near $82.51 — up roughly 8% and 4% on the month, up 30% and 28% on the year, and far below March's $126 peak. Crude has partially normalized. Freight has not. In the week ending August 21, the Baltic Exchange assessed the benchmark Middle East–China VLCC route at Worldscale 570, round-trip earnings near $585,000 per day. A year ago, $60,000 was a good day.

And gas is where the real damage is compounding. Dutch TTF closed near €65.83 per megawatt-hour, up 14% on the month and up 107% year over year. European storage is 63% full, the lowest reading for late August since 2009. Qatari and Gulf LNG cargoes that should be filling those caverns are queued behind a strait that admits two ships a day.

Most people are watching the oil price and concluding the crisis is easing. The oil price is the wrong instrument. Watch the freight rate and the storage percentage — those are the two numbers that will decide what Europeans pay to heat their homes in January, and what European industry does about it.

If you own European industrials, you are short natural gas whether you meant to be or not.

Technology

Nvidia Wrote China Out of the Forecast

Nvidia reported on August 26. Revenue of $96.2 billion, up 106% year over year. Data center revenue of $89.0 billion, up 117%. Guidance for the current quarter: $108 billion, plus or minus 2%.

One sentence in that release matters more than any of those numbers: "NVIDIA is not assuming any Data Center compute revenue from China in its outlook."

Read it again. The most valuable company on earth has built a $108 billion quarterly forecast that assigns the world's second-largest economy a value of zero. Jensen Huang's framing of the moment was characteristically compressed: "AI has reached its inflection point. It's doing useful work. Its tokens are productive and profitable. Now, compute is revenue."

The stock dipped 1.3%, then closed up around 5% once the CFO put backlog north of $2 trillion on the call. Mark Malek, chief investment officer at Siebert, summarized the reaction: "Market has already priced in perfection and moved on."

Meanwhile the market Nvidia zeroed out is not standing still. On August 21, DeepSeek shipped V4-Flash-Vision-Exp. On August 26, the same day as the earnings, Zhipu AI released GLM-5.3-Flash and Alibaba released Qwen3.8-Flash-Next. The April release of DeepSeek V4 was tuned explicitly to run on Huawei silicon at prices Western labs cannot match. Cut a country off from the best chips and it optimizes for the chips it has. That is the entire history of technology in one sentence.

And the tariff wall is still going up. Washington is preparing a 7.5% "overcapacity" tariff on Chinese goods ahead of Xi Jinping's September 24 state visit — sized to bring the replacement rate to almost exactly the 20% ceiling Washington committed to in July. Stack it on Chinese semiconductors and the Section 301 exposure approaches 70%. Beijing's commerce ministry answered in the usual register: it reserves "the right to take all necessary measures."

Here's what matters for you. Big Tech capital spending is tracking toward roughly $725 billion this year, up 77%. That spending is now the load-bearing wall under U.S. equity earnings growth, and it is being underwritten by a compute market with one supplier, one customer base, and a geography deliberately removed from the model.

03 In Focus

The State Is Setting Prices Again — And You Are Not Positioned For It

In December 2020, $18 trillion of the world's debt was trading at negative interest rates. Investors were paying governments for the privilege of lending to them, and the reason they accepted it was simple: they believed the state would keep buying, forever, at any price. That was the last era. Its central fact was that governments manipulated the price of money and left the price of everything else to the market.

Look at what happened in the past ten days and you can see the new arrangement taking shape.

Washington fixed the price of terbium and dysprosium by contract. A U.S. naval blockade rerouted seventy ships and set, by force, which cargoes reach which buyers. A tariff schedule was engineered to land at a politically negotiated 20% rather than any economically derived number. The most valuable company in the world removed an entire nation from its revenue forecast — not because demand vanished, but because a licence might not be granted. And the European Commission disbursed €3.47 billion in a single tranche to buy drones, missiles and Gripen fighters for a country that is not a member.

Here's the idea. The state has moved from managing the price of money to allocating physical goods. Metals, molecules, hulls, wafers. That is not regulation. That is industrial policy with a balance sheet, and it changes the character of returns.

Let me put this in plain English. When governments set the price of money, the winners were whoever held the most duration and the most leverage. When governments allocate physical goods, the winners are whoever holds the constrained physical asset and the political relationship that unlocks it. Those are two completely different portfolios.

When the state guarantees your revenue, your business stops being a business and becomes a policy. Policies get renewed. They also get cancelled.

So what do you do about it?

First — own the bottleneck, not the theme. The Pentagon paid triple the Chinese price for dysprosium and market price for NdPr. That spread is the whole lesson. Value accrues to the input that cannot be substituted, not to the sector with the best story. Ask of any holding: if Beijing turned this off tomorrow, could the West replace it inside three years? If yes, you own a commodity. If no, you own leverage.

Second — price the political term, not the resource life. A 25-year mine life underwritten by a five-year purchase commitment is a five-year asset with a twenty-year tail of hope. Every one of these deals has a renewal date, and most of those dates sit on the far side of an election. Underwrite the contract, not the orebody.

Third — respect the fiscal ceiling on all of it. Every price floor, every loan guarantee, every disbursement is funded by a Treasury paying $931 billion a year in interest at an average rate of 3.41% and climbing, against $40 trillion of debt and a long bond at 5.17%. Industrial policy is not free, and the bond market is the referee. If the thirty-year keeps grinding higher, the cheques get smaller, and that is the correlated risk sitting underneath the entire trade.

And one more thing. Gold at roughly $4,650 an ounce this morning — up 3.2% on the week, up 37% on the year, and still some 18% below its January high — is not trading on inflation expectations. It is trading on the observation that governments are now willing to set prices by decree. Silver at $68 and copper at $6.54 a pound, which printed a record high earlier this month, are telling you the same thing in a different accent.

If you don't own hard assets in a world where states allocate hard assets, I urge you to reconsider your allocation.

Horse, meet water.

04 Looking Ahead

Warsh at Jackson Hole — Friday, August 28, 10:00 a.m. ET

His first keynote as chair, nineteen days before the September 16 FOMC. If you hear anything that sounds like tolerance for mid-3s inflation, the long end will tell you within the hour. If you hear the opposite, check your duration before the open on Monday.

USA Rare Earth shareholder vote — Friday, August 28, 10:00 a.m. ET

The mine-to-magnet build in Stillwater, Oklahoma is carrying up to $1.6 billion of Commerce Department support. Watch what the shareholder base does when the government becomes the anchor customer.

The Xi state visit — September 24, Washington

Xi Jinping's first U.S. state visit in over a decade, arriving with a 7.5% overcapacity tariff likely on the table and fresh Treasury sanctions on Chinese and Hong Kong firms already drawing retaliation threats. If you hold anything with a Chinese supply chain, this is your date.

November 10 and November 27

The Kuala Lumpur truce expires, then China's suspension of enhanced licensing for gallium, germanium, antimony and graphite. Two deadlines, seventeen days apart, both of which reprice the same set of companies. Positioning ahead of these will get crowded in October.

European gas storage into winter

63% full and the lowest for the date since 2009, with TTF up 107% on the year and Hormuz admitting two ships a day. If storage is still under 70% in late September, European power costs stop being a commodity story and become an industrial-production story.